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VIEW OF A NATIONAL CONCERN

Saving, Investment,
and Capital Shortages
By MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM
Director, Center for the Study of American Business
Washington Univ., St. Louis, Mo.

To meet the challenges of the future-they
come upon us in the new year-our
country needs an economic environment
more conducive to private saving and
investment, and economic policies and
legislation that will bring it about
Engineers usually understand the
pivotal role of capital investment in
providing the basis for the future
standard of living-for increasing
productivity and thus giving society
an opportunity to dampen inflationary pressures as real income
rises. Regrettably, a great many of
our fellow citizens lack that
economic sophistication, at least
for the present.
As an educator, I find it amusing
when my students discover Maoist
economists writing about the need
to hold down consumption in the
Chinese economy to free up the
capital resources need to invest in
the future growth of that economy.
"Why, they are not even a
capitalistic society," they will note
in wonderment. Then the thought
will sink in-sometimes with a little
faculty assistance-that a rising
stock of capital is necessary for any
growing society, capitalistic (i.e.,
private enterprise or marketoriented) or otherwise. It is really a
basic matter of how much we want
to eat, drink, and be merry todayand how much we want to set aside
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for the future. Boiled down to its
fundamentals, assuring an adequate flow of saving and investment
is little more than demonstrating a
proper concern for the future.
But a more technical set of
problems faces the serious student
of what I call "capital adequacy" in
the United States. Frankly, it is
very awkward to talk about capital
shortages at a time when so many
American industries report excess
capacity. After all, current manufacturing output is about one-fifth
below the potential it could be at
normal operating rates. It is no less
awkward to urge reducing emphasis on consumption at a time
when the average consumer has
experienced a marked reduction in
his or her real living standard.
Despite the recovery to date, real
consumer outlays per capita fall
below what they were at the start of
the recent recession.
Moreover, at least one prestigious New York City fmancial
institution deplores the very notion
of capital shortages, noting that in
every period the total flow of saving

inevitably winds up equal to the
amount of investment made.
Meanwqile, a large Washingtonbased research organization tells us
that, for a very considerable future
period, sufficient savings are likely ·
to be forthcoming to meet anticipated investment requirements.
Given the well nigh universal
propensity of virtually every element of the society to advocate
cutting its taxes-and/or increasing the expenditures devoted
to the causes that it favors-should
we not dismiss the continued pleas
for national policies to foster more
saving and i.t:ivestment as merely
misguided or self-serving appeals
on the part of higher-income
segments of the population?
Certainly, many will respond to
that question with a loud and
unequivocal "Yes."
Those familiar with my views
know that I believe that there are
important reasons to be concerned
about the future adequacy of saving
and investment in the United
States. Yet, in passing, I feel obliged to point out that the naivete and
exaggeration on the part of some of
the proponents of the capitalshortage notion inevitably have
triggered adverse reactions.
In what follows, I take up four
key aspects of capital fomation:
First, a necessary distinction
between short-term conditions and
longer-term needs; second, a basic
understanding of the process by
which a sluggish potential flow of
saving is made to equal what
appears to be an excessively robust
set of investment demands; third,
an excursion into the never-never
world of long-term economic
forecasting; and fourth, the role of
public policy, both in influencing
the flow of saving and investment
and in meeting other national
priorities.

Short-Term Glut Versus
Long-Term Shortage?
First, to clear the air, I would say
that, as a general proposition,
under most conceivable cirAstronautics & Aeronautics

cumstances, there will not be
widespread shortages of productive
capacity in the U.S. in the coming
year or two. In effect, I am saying,
let us not cry wolf.
But by its very nature, capital
investment is much more a matter
of the future than of the present. If,
for example, we are to meet the
likely growth in power needs during
the 1980s, this nation must make
the necessary investments in new
capacity today (some would have
chosen yesterday).
Capital investment surely is the
prime example of that extended
economic process where it is foolish
to hold your fire until you see the
whites of their eyes, or the green of
the consumer's demand.
Viewed in a more fundamental
way, new investments of various
kinds-physical capital, so-called
human capital in the form of
education and training and R&Dprovide the rising productivity and
output which in turn fundamentally support sustainable
increases in consumer living
standards.
To a very considerable extent,
the economic policies to be followed
in the coming year will be major
determinants of the economy's
ability to avoid widespread
shortages, at least for the period
until 1980. To the extent that
monetary and ftscal policy will
remain on the relatively modest
course that has now been set,
existing and planned increases in
plant and equipment should
generally be adequate to the
economy's demands through most
of the 1970s. To be sure, sporadic
shortages of specific indus trial
supplies are likely to arise from
time to time, as they have in the
past. After 1980 the prospects seem
less optimistic, and will depend on
the enactment of some of the
specific proposals that I will
present a little later.
Should, however, the President
and the Congress adopt a far more
expansionary set of polici.es, then
we might soon fmd the economy
December 1975

pushing the limits of industrial
capacity, particularly in such key
sectors as steel. Allen Sinai and
Roger Brinner have estimated the
consequences of a more stimulating
policy-one characterized by
average annual growth rates of 910% in the money supply and a
fiscal policy eased by $15 billion of
additional tax cuts in 1976. Under
that alternative, they estimate a
capital shortage by 1978, in both
the financial and physical senses.
Short- and long-term interest
rates, under the "stimulation"
scenario, would soar to double-digit
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levels. The accompanying bottlenecks in production would
rapidly push prices up in
chemicals, plastics, lumber, paper,
textiles, metals, metal products,
machinery, and transportation
equipment. 1
Those who scoff at the possibility
of a capital shortage and simultaneously urge a more expansionary
economic policy would seem to be
plainly inconsistent in their
analysis.
Equating Saving and Investment
Some economists, as well as
others, seem to be offended by
studies that show-for some future
year-a yawning gap between the
amount of saving that will be
available and the amount of investment that will be desired. They
note, quite properly, that we are
dealing with an accounting

identity. Unlike many of the
speeches based on it, the oftencited study by the New York Stock
Exchange does clearly and properly
distinguish between the gap that
they show between forecasted
saving and investment flows and
the equality-at some level-of the
actual saving and investment that
will take place. 2
The equality between actual
saving and actual investment
resembles the equality, on business
balance sheets, of assets and
liabilities (including net worth).
Yet, at the company level, we do
not let that simple accounting
identity inhibit serious analysis. We
understand that the Assets =
Liabilities relationship is true alike
for bankrupt concerns as well as
the most profitable corporations.
Similarly, we need to remind
ourselves that, for a national
economy, Saving = Investment,
both for a rapidly growing economy
and a stagnant or even declining
one. There are serious questions to
be considered: At what level does
balancing of saving and investment
take place? What investment needs
are rationed (or "crowded") QUt in
the process? What types of investments are actually funded?
As Henry W allich has pointed
out, capital inadequacy can show
up in various forms. First, it can
manifest itself in bottleneck
situations, with some industries not
having enough capacity to serve
their customers when the economy
as a whole is operating at a high
level. Second, an overall shortage of
capital with respect to the labor
force is possible, even if capacity is
fairly evenly distributed among
industries. Under such conditions,
there would not be enough jobs to
provide full employment even when
industry is operating close to
capacity. 3 The joint concern of
business and labor in increasing
productivity capacity in such an
event would be obvious.
A more specialized defmition of
capital shortage has been
developed by Sinai and Brinner.
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They use the term to refer to an
economy which meets either of two
conditions:
1. The financial system fails to
provide the necessary funds to
fmance the economy's expenditures
at reasonably stable rates of interest.
2. Capital expenditures are
insufficient to generate enough
capacity to meet the demands of
the economy at reasonably stable
prices.
W allich contends that during periods in 1973 and 1974 the American
economy experienced the two sets
of symptoms of captial shortage
that he describes. Sinai and
Brinner warn us about the
possibility of experiencing their two
defmitions of capital shortages
within the very next few years.
The newer and smaller businesses, rather than the larger and
better established companies,
usually get crowded out of credit
markets during periods of fmancial
stringency. That should be of
concern to all who favor a competitive economy. And the available
data are striking. Of the $6.4
billion of bonds issued by the
companies listed in the Fortune
500, $5.1 billion was raised by the
top 100 and $1.3 billion by the next
400. The top 100 companies
reported 28 bond issues in 1974 and
the bottom 100 only 1. 4
It is not my purpose to provide
yet another set of computer runs of
future capital supply and demand.
But there are important reaso:ns to
expect that saving in the years
ahead will be weak by historical
standards and investment needs
and demands quite strong.
On the supply side, several basic
factors will be dampening down the
potential for generating savings in
the coming decade. In absolute
terms, of course, there will be large
increases in funds available for
investment. Important forces,
however, will be exercising a
depressing effect on the growth rate
of saving. Consumers, a basic
source of savings in the economy,
12

will be experiencing some adverse
factors. The changing age
distribution of the United States
population suggests that, if past
savings patterns are maintained,
the personal saving rate (although
not the absolute amount) could
decline over the coming decade.
Just compare the anticipated
trends in the low-saving age groups
with the high-saving age brackets.
That does not require much
forecasting ability because we are
talking about people who are
already born and living in the U.S.
The prospects are very unfavorable.
The number of Americans in the
high-spending, low-saving age
brackets (20-34) will be rising
substantially, from 46 million in
1972 to 60 million in 1982. These
are the young people who borrow
heavily, particularly to finance and
furnish new homes. Most of the
people who shift from renting to
buying a home are under 35. In
striking contrast, the high-saving
age brackets (40-54) will show a
decline in absolute numbers, from
36 in 1972 to 34 million in 1982.
Another factor dampening down
the private saving rate is the
repeated 1iberalization of social
security and other government
welfare programs. This relationship
has been noted by several scholars,
liberal and conservative. Recent
studies show that the provision of
public pensions substantially
depresses the rate of private
saving. 5 With the Social Security
system operating at best on a payas-you-go basis, there is not offsetting government saving. Should
the system begin to operate at a
deficit, there would be government
dissaving. [Ed.-The Social
Security Commission estimates a
deficit of $3 billion this year and $6
billion next.]
I am going to skip over lightly the
question of the adequacy of
business saving, not because it is
unimportant, but because others,
notably George Terborgh, already
have done such a thorough and
convincing job of explaining how

inflation has caused substantial
overstatements of real business
profits. especially as a result of
inadequate depreciation allowances
and transient inventory profits. 6
Real corporate profits (adjusted for
these factors) declined by over 40%
in the past decade, from $37.0 billion in 1965 to $20.6 billion in 1974.
On the demand side, in contrast,
there clearly will be many rising
needs for capital investment, both
to meet new priorities, such as
domestic energy reliance, and the
requirements directly imposed on
business by government. For
example, both public and private
projections show that rising annual
dollar. outlays for new pollutio.ncontrol facilities will be required to
meet existing legal requirements.
About 5% of industrial plant and
equipment investments are expected to be devoted to these
purposes. In addition, governmentmandated ind ustrial•safety and
noise-abatement outlays will be
significant, with estimates ranging
to $40 billion or more during the
coming five-year period. 7 These
government-mandated investment
requirements help to explain the
anomaly of a declining return on
capital, which is supposed to be a
characteristic of a capital-surplus
economy. It is evident that the
typical firm realizes little if any
return on these involuntary outlays.
Thus a larger than average return is
earned on the voluntary capital
investments that are made.
Economic Forecasting

Intentionally or not, some
economists seem to be competing
for the role formerly played by the
late Jack Benny-ftrst-rate deadpan comedian. I am referring to
analysts who tell us, straight faced,
that saving flows will be adequate
to the investment fmancing task in
the decade ahead, if only the
Federal Government learns to
operate at a surplus for an extended period of time-an eventuality as likely as my becoming
young and handsome tomorrow. To
Astronautics & Aeronautics

back that up, they cite several
public and private forecasts that
show that, by 1980 or some other
future year, the Federal Government may be operating at a surplus, and thus adding to the
availability of private capital funds.
(For example, the President's
January budget estimates a margin
of $35 billion by which revenues
would exceed outlays on a fullemployment basis in 1980. 8 )
Do not be misled by these statistical exercises. I have done them
myself and find them very usefulas a form of mental gymnastics.
The key to understanding these, as
well as any other long-term
forecasts, is to look at the underlying assumptions. That is
critical in this case. The key
assumption, which may not always
be apparent to the users of these
forecasts, is that no further change
will be made in the expenditure
programs or revenue structure of
the Federal Government.
This is plainly unrealistic. If
there is anything that can be
forecast with confidence, it is that
over the years the Congress will
pass laws increasing the scope of
existing programs and instituting
new spending programs. Likely
candidates are not hard to find,
ranging from incentives to explore
and develop new domestic energy
sources to a national healthinsurance program.
Do not interpret this as an attack
on the projections per se, but on
their use. They are not intended to
be forecasts of reality. Rather, they
are a useful input into the policy
planning process. They indicate the
amount of discretion available to
increase outlays and/or cut taxes
within the existing budget structure. In the future, as in the past,
the public's appetite for new
government services and benefits
will likely outrun its willingness to
pay for this largesse in the form of
higher taxes. Thus, on balance, the
Federal Government is likei, to run
deficits and, on balance, to be not a
supplier but an important user of
December 19 75

investment funds in years ahead.

The Role of Publlc Polley
Before considering possible
changes in public policy, it is
important to understand the
impact of existing policies. We
frequently hear that our current tax
system is biased in favor of consumption and against saving. If you
have any doubt about the matter, I
believe that you can resolve it
quickly with a very simple and
straightforward example.
Consider three factory workers,
A, B, C, each of the same age, the
same work experience and size of
family, and same compensation. To
keep it simple, assume that each
rents the house that he (or she) lives
in. Mr. A regularly spends what he
earns, no more and no less. Mr. B.,
a saver, deposits a portion of his
paycheck into his savings account
each week. Mr. C. not only spends
everything he earns, but also
borrows to the hilt, buying as much
on credit as he can.
The key question: Which of the
three pays the most income tax and
which pays the least? Clearly, Mr.
B, the saver, will have the highest
tax bill-paying taxes on his wages
as well as on the interest that he
earns on his savings account. Mr. C
winds up with the lowest tax bill, as
he receives a tax deduction for the
interest he pays on his borrowings.
Actual practice of course includes
many variations in the tax treatment of financial transactions. Yet,
as a general principle, it does seem
that, for the average citizen, the
existing personal income tax
structure favors consumption over
saving. In addition, many of the
government spending programs
operate with a similar effect.
Let us assume that A, B, and C
all get laid off at the same time and
none of them obtains ~ new job.
Mr. C, the big spender, will be the
first one who will be eligible to
receive welfare, food stamps, and
related benefits. Mr. A, the pay-asyou-go man, will be next. The last
to qualify for Federal assistance

wiii be Mr. B, the big saver. Unlike
the good Lord, the Peds do not
seem to help those who help
themselves.
What can be done to provide
greater encouragement to saving
and investment? The first and
perhaps most important idea that
comes to mind is essentially a
negative one. The Federal Government should stop being such a large
dissaver. That is, it should
eliminate or at least reduce the
massive extent to which it competes
with the private sector for the
relatively limited supply of -investment capital. As the economy
continues to recover from its
recession lows, the rising pace of
business activity will yield increasing flows of Federal revenues.
Congress
increases
Unless
government spending at the same
rapid rate, the result will be a
substantial reduction in the Federal
deficit in 1977 and 1978. The result
is not a foregone conclusion. The
advocates of economy will have to
exert sufficient political pressure to
offset the proponents of greater
government spending.
There is a related question,
which is far more technical, and
hence for which there is little public
support or even understanding. I
am referring to the need to curtail
the various off-budget agencies.
These are mere subterfuges
whereby normal Federal expenditures do not show up in the
budget. Not only do these expenditures continue but, because
they are no longer subject to the
scrutiny of the budgetary process,
they are expanding at a far more
rapid rate. In Fiscal Year 1972,
they totaled $249 miiiion. In the
Fiscal Year 1976 budget they are
estimated at over $10 billion. That
is $10 billion that the Federal
Government has to borrow above
and beyond the official budget
deficit. Should the proposal for an
off-budget Energy Independence
Agency be adopted, the size of this
category would more than triple.
It is with very great reluctance
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that I call your attention to one
specific off-budget agency, the
Federal Financing Bank. Unfortunately, like so many government activities, the Bank is performing functions not intended by
its original sponsors. It is also
buying debt issued by private
organizations and other institutions
outside of the Federal Government
in cases where those issues carry a
government guarantee. That's just
what we don't need-something
that increases the Treasury's
borrowing needs further still. The
Congress should promptly repeal
the authorization for the Federal
Financing Bank to provide credit to
private (non· F edera[) bo"owers.
A second useful contribution
that the Federal Government can
make to ensure capital adequacy in
the years ahead is in the area of
government controls over business.
An increasing number of regulatory
agencies impose investment
requirements on business ftrmsstipulate investments which do not
generate more productive capacity
but are intended to meet various
social priorities. I do not propose
that all of these social requirements
be eliminated, but rather that they
be subject to the rigors of a
benefit/cost test. These expensive
Federal regulatory requirements
should only be continued where it
can be demonstrated that their
value or benefit to the society
exceeds the cost that they impose
on the public.
I must confess that I am far more
enthusiastic about the desirability
of these essentially negative approaches than I am about the
various possibilities for providing
positive incentives to saving and/ or
investment. In a sense, my advice to
the Congress is a variation of an old
plea, "Don't just stand there, undo
something."
But now let me turn to those
more positive possibilities. I see
some important and useful lessons
to be learned from the past. The
more specific the focus of a Federal
tax incentive, the more likely that
14

inefficiencies and other unwanted
side-effects are going to result. At
this point I certainly have no desire
to add to the difficulties that the
real estate investment trusts
(REITs) are facing. But we do need
to acknowledge that the situation
was made possible by specialinterest tax legislation which
permits the REITs-unlike most
other corporations-to deduct the
dividends they pay out from their
taxable income.
What is needed is true tax reform
of general applicability. To a
growing number of economists,
both liberal and conservative, the
most economically sensible and
efficient approach to increasing
private saving is to reduce the
corporate income tax. That action
would have a number of desirable
effects. Clearly, a lower corporate
income tax rate would increase
after-tax corporate profits. That
also should increase the amount of
business ''saving" in the form of
retained earnings. But not all of the
tax reduction is likely to be saved.
Some of the added profits would be
disbursed in the form of higher
dividends, and that increases individual disposable income and
personal saving. To some extent,
the tax saving may also be shiftedforward to consumers in the form
of lower prices, or rather more
slowly rising prices, and backward
to labor in the form of higher
wages, salaries, and fringe benefits.
The widespread nature of these
resultant benefits are hardly cause
for concern. Their precise
distribution would depend on the
operation of market forces.
A lower corporate income tax
rate would reduce the indirect but
pervasive role of the tax collector in
internal business decision-making.
It would tend to promote more
efficient use of resources to the
extent that fewer low-priority business expenses would be incurred
merely because they are tax
deductible. It would soften the
double taxation of corporate income. A lower corporate income

tax would also reduce current bias
in the tax system toward debt
fmancing-because interest paid
on debf is deductible from taxable
income and in most cases dividends
on equity capital are not. Rising
debt/ equity ratios and declining
interest coverages on corporate
balance-sheets clearly demonstrate
the importance of permitting a
greater reliance on equity rather
than on debt financing in the
future.
C. Lowell Harriss has also
pointed out that the present corporate income tax may contain
some of the most regressive
elements in the entire tax system.
He has in mind the portion of the
corporate income tax that reduces
the income that would otherwise be
available to such "capitalistic"
shareholders as philanthropic institutions, foundations, universities,
and employee pension funds.
Harriss contrasts this with a tax at
the personal level which can differentiate among various categories
of people on some rational or fair
basis. 9
But, unlike the negative
suggestions that I made earlier, I
acknowledge that tax cuts would
increase the Federal deficit and
thus increase the amount of government borrowing that competes
with private investment demands.
Hopefully, the beneficial impacts
on production and employment of a
cut in corporate income taxes
would generate "feedback" in the
form of some significant compensating increases in federal
revenues. Unfortunately, in the
past, most proposals for reducing
the corporate income tax have been
defeated by what may be termed
demagogic
appeals
against
reducing the tax burden on the
"undeserving rich."
Charles McLure of Rice Univ.
states unequivocally, on the basis of
his examination of the public
fmance literature, that a separate
tax on corporation income cannot
be justified under commonly accepted canons of taxation. 1 0
Astronautics & Aeronautics

Tilford Gaines offered what may
be the simplest and most effective
response: "Of the many approaches that might be taken to
lower unemployment rates permanently, i.e., to create more jobs,
encouragement to capital investment must rank number 1." 11
Nevertheless, at least in the past,
it has seemed easier to get far-lessefficient special interest legislation
into law. If the naive advocates of
closing tax "loopholes" have their
way, what we will see is the
enactment of punitive legislation
further reducing the incentive and
ability of the private sector to save
and invest.
It is ironic that the pressures to
increase capital-gains taxation, for
example, are far stronger in the
United States than in other industrialized nations, although our
tax burden on such gains already is
so much higher. In France, The
Netherlands, and West Germany,
for example, capital gains are
generally exempt from income tax.
If the Congress does take specific
action in the corporate tax area,
rather than "tightening" up on
capital gains, it should give
favorable consideration to converting depreciation allowances to a
true capital-recovery system. This
of course could be done by shifting
the depreciation base from historical cost to current replacement
cost. Such forward-looking action
would go a long way to halting the
decline of real saving in the
business sector of the private
economy.
The depreciation practices of
other leading industrialized nations
are in general far more liberal.
Even including the effect of the
investment credit and the ADR,
only about 23.5% of a new investment in machinery and
equipment can be written off in the
frrst year under our Federal tax
system, while France allows 31.3%,
Japan allows 37.1, Canada, 50.0,
and the United Kingdom atfull 100
percent.
Individual, consumer savings
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could be encouraged through legislation introduced by Senator Paul
Fannin (S.4054) and Representative
Jack Kemp (H.R. 7240 and H.R.
7241). Senator Fannin's bill would
exclude from gross income the frrst
$1000 interest on deposits in
savings institutions. Representative
Kemp's proposal would provide a
10% tax credit for the frrst $1000 of
funds either deposited into a
savings account or used to purchase
the stock or bonds of a domestic
corporation. It would also eliminate
double taxation of common-stock
dividends and lighten the tax load
on capital gains.
These are attractive proposals
which would begin to move the
Federal tax structure away from
saving and investment so heavily
and toward placing more of the
burden on consumption. The
timing of their enactment no doubt
will be influenced strongly by the
overall state of the Federal budget.
Concluding Remarks

The government's role as a
competitor for and an allocator of
investment funds in our economy
needs to be restricted substantially.
We also need greater public
recognition that the government
credit device does nothing to expand the volume of capital funds
available to the economy. It involves literally robbing Peter to pay
(or lend to) Paul. But it is a game
that government often likes to
play-because it looks so painless
to the taxpayer. More fundamentally, an economic environment needs to be created that
promotes private saving and investment.
Unless we as a nation act on
many fronts to encourage private
saving and to dampen down
government competition for investment funds-a lower tax
burden on saving, less deficit
spending, and more realistic
regulation-we must seriously
consider the very real possibility
that this nation will soon be entering a period in which the un-

derlying demand for capital tends
to outrun the supply of saving to
fmance it. In practice, of course,
available saving will be allocated
one way or another among the
various categories of investment
requirements. But a high average
level of interest rates is likely to be
the balancing factor and numerous
weaker demanders of capitalnotably small and new business,
local governments, and individuals-will be elbowed out of
fmancial markets and thus will
obtain smaller real shares of the
nation's resources.
Hence, gearing public policy to
encouraging an adequate flow of
saving and investment does indeed
show a proper concern for the
future.
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